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THE VERMONT SUPREME COURT TACKLES SAME-SEx
MARRIAGE RIGHTS
"[T]o acknowledge plaintiffs as Vermonters who seek nothing
more, nor less, than legal protection and security for their
avowed commitment to an intimate and lasting human
relationship is simply, when all is said and done, a recognition
of our common humanity."
CHIEFJUSTICEJEFFERYAMESTOY'
On December 20, 1999, the Vermont Supreme Court issued a
groundbreaking ruling in the case of Baker v. State' granting same-sex
couples the same benefits and privileges enjoyed by married
opposite-sex couples under Vermont law. The question presented in
Baker was whether "the State of Vermont [could] exclude same-sex
couples from the benefits and protections that its laws provide to
opposite-sex married couples."4 The court held that the State is
"constitutionally required to extend to same-sex couples the common
benefits and protections that flow from marriage under Vermont
law."
Although the court held that same-sex couples are entitled to the
same benefits as their opposite-sex counterparts, it left unanswered
the specific form of relief they are due,6 leaving the legislature with
1. Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864,889 (Vt. 1999).
2. Id.
3. See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1 (1998) (defining the requirements and eligibility for
marriage); see also, e.g., VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1605 (1998) (codifying the "marital privilege"
rule); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 10, 461, 465, 470 (providing for spouses' beneficial interests in
each other's will).
4. Baker, 744 A.2d at 867.
5. Id.
6. Id. at 898 (Johnson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (stating that the
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the choice of amending the marriage statute or creating a parallel
system of domestic partnerships.7
I. FACTS
The case began after three same-sex couples, all of whom enjoyed
committed long-term relationships,8 were denied marriage licenses
after having applied at the offices of their respective town clerks.9 In
response, the plaintiffs brought suit for a declaratory judgment
stating that the refusal to issue the marriage licenses violated
Vermont's marriage statutes and the Vermont Constitution.'0 The
trial court held "that the marriage statutes could not be construed to
permit the issuance of a license to same-sex couples."" The trial
court also ruled that the State had an interest in promoting "the link
between procreation and child rearing.""
The plaintiffs challenged the denial of the marriage licenses on two
grounds. First, plaintiffs argued that the denial violated the Vermont
marriage statute.' s Second, plaintiffs argued that the denial of the
marriage licenses based on the applicants' sex violated the Common
Benefits Clause of the Vermont Constitution.4
II. STATUTORY CLAIM
Although the plaintiffs conceded that the plain meaning of
marriage under the relevant statutes is the union between a man and
a woman,' they argued that "the underlying purpose of marriage is to
protect and encourage the union of committed couples and that,
absent an explicit legislative prohibition, the statutes should be
interpreted broadly to include committed same-sex couples."' 6 In
court does not provide plaintiffs any relief, but instead "abdicates [its] constitutional duty to
redress violations of constitutional rights" to the legislative branch).
7. See iii at 886 (stating that it is the prerogative of the legislature to create the means of
addressing the constitutional mandate of the court).
8. See id. at 867 (stating that the couples had lived together for between four and twenty-
five years). Two of the couples have raised children together. Id.
9. Baker v. State, 744A.2d 864,867 (Vt. 1999).
10. See id, at 868 (recounting the procedural history of the case).
11. Id.
12. Id
13. See iUt (discussing plaintiffs' statutory claim).
14. See VT. CONSr. art. VII, § 1, which states: "That government is, or ought to be
instituted for the common benefit, protection, and security of the people, nation or
community, and not for the particular emolument or advantage of any single person, family, or
set of persons, who are a part only of that community."
15. SeeBaker v. State, 744 A.2d 864, 868 (Vt. 1999).
16. Id.
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making this argument, the plaintiffs relied on In re B.L.V.B., 7 where
the Vermont Supreme Court held that a woman could adopt her
same-sex partner's children without terminating the natural mother's
parental rights.'8
B.L. VB. involved an adoption statute which stated that an adoption
deprived natural parents of their legal rights.'9 However, the statute
contained a narrow exception for cases in which the adoption was by
the "spouse" of the natural parent.2 The court interpreted "spouse"
to include the same-sex partner of the natural mother so as not to
defeat the purpose of the statute, which was to safeguard the child.21
The court rejected plaintiffs' argument and distinguished B.L.V.B.,
noting that the marriage statutes did not include a narrow exception
that required a broad reading in order not to defeat the legislative
purpose.u Instead, the court found clear evidence that "marriage
under [Vermont's] statutory scheme consists of a union between a
man and a woman."23 The court thus rejected the plaintiffs' statutory
claim.
III. CONSTITUTIONAL CLAIM
The plaintiffs also claimed that the law's refusal to allow them
marriage licenses violated their "right to the common benefit and
protection 24 of the law guaranteed by [the Common Benefits Clause]
of the Vermont Constitution."25 Justice Amestoy summarized
Vermont common benefits jurisprudence, stating "case law has
17. 628 A.2d 1271 (Vt. 1993).
18. Id. at 1272-73.
19. See i&
20. SeeVT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 448 (1998).
21. See B.L.V.B., 628 A.2d at 1273 (stating that "to apply the literal language of the statute
in these circumstances would defeat the statutory purpose and reach an absurd result")
(citations omitted).
22. See Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864, 869 (Vt. 1999) ("We are not dealing in this case with a
narrow statutory exception requiring a broader reading than its literal words would permit in
order to avoid a result plainly at odds with the legislative purpose.").
23. See id.
24. Among the rights and protections that the plaintiffs were denied, the court mentioned
access to spouse's medical, life and disability insurance; hospital visitation and medical decision-
making privileges; spousal support, intestate succession, and homestead protections; marital
evidentiary privilege; and division of property upon divorce. See id. at 883-84. In total, 300
Vermont statutes govern the burdens and benefits of marriage. See Panel Shows Divene Views on
Same-Sex Issue BURLINGTON FREE PRESS (visited Mar. 23, 2000)
<http://www.burlingtonfreepress.com/newstory36.htm> (describing some of the benefits
denied same-sex couples under Vermont law).
25. See Baker, 774 A.2d at 869-70; see also supra note 14 (setting forth the text of the
Common Benefits Clause).
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consistently demanded in practice that statutory exclusions from
publicly-conferred benefits and protections must be 'premised on an
appropriate and overriding interest. ' 26 The test adopted by the
majority in Baker is "whether the omission of a part of the community
from the benefit, protection and security of the challenged law bears
a reasonable and just relation to the governmental purpose."2 7 This is
essentially a balancing test, whereby the state's interest in its stated
goals is weighed against the excluded group's interest in the
"common benefit, protection and security of the people."28 Although
the Common Benefits Clause is similar to the Federal Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment in its purpose, in
that both prohibit unequal treatment by the government, analysis
under the Common Benefits Clause of an exclusion from a publicly
conferred benefit does not, according to the majority opinion of
Baker, implicate multiple tiers of review.2 In fact, the court instructed
that instead of determining whether the excluded class is non-
suspect, suspect or quasi-suspect, the court must merely delineate an
excluded class, for purposes of review. °
The court outlined the analysis for determining whether a statutory
exclusion violates the Common Benefits Clause. First, the court must
delineate the class.3' Second, the court must identify the state's
"purpose in drawing the classification, and whether the nature of the
classification is reasonably necessary to accomplish the state's claimed
objectives." 3 2 Finally, the court must decide whether the "omission of
26. See Baker, 774 A.2d at 873 (citing State v. Ludlow Supermarkets, Inc., 448 A.2d 791, 795
(Vt. 1982)).
27. Id. at 878-79.
28. See id. at 871 (citing Ludlow Supermarkets, Inc., 448 A.2d at 795).
29. See Baker, 744 A.2d at 876 (Amestoy, J.) (stating that the text and history of the
Common Benefits Clause yield "no rigid categories or formulas of analysis"). The court's
historical analysis of the Common Benefits Clause illustrates that, unlike the drafters of the
Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, the fi-amers of the Clause were striving to
secure "equal access to public benefits and protections for the community as a whole" and the
prevention of governmental and political favoritism, not to prevent discrimination on account
of racial or class distinctions. Id. at 876. But see id. at 890 (DooleyJ., concurring) (arguing that
the analysis adopted by the majority opinion was a departure from the traditional two-tiered
approach employed by the Vermont Supreme Court in past challenges to statutory schemes
under the Common Benefits Clause, where classifications involving civil rights were given
higher level scrutiny than mere economic classifications). This two-tiered scheme is illustrated
in the test employed by the Court in the recent case Brigham v. State "Where a statutory scheme
affects fundamental constitutional rights or involves suspect classifications, both federal and
state decisions have recognized that proper equal protection analysis necessitates a more
searching scrutiny." Id. at 890 (DooleyJ., concurring) (quoting Brigham v. State, 692 A.2d 384,
396 (Vt. 1997)).
30. See id. at 878 (discussing the court's standard of review).
31. Id.
32. Id.
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a part of the community from the benefit, protection and security of
the challenged law bears a reasonable and just relation to the
governmental purpose.
"s3
Applying the test set forth above, the court first identified the
excluded class as "anyone who wishes to marry someone of the same
sex."u  The court next examined whether the government's main
stated purpose--"furthering the link between procreation and child
rearing"--represented a valid public interest reasonably furthered by
the exclusion of same-sex couples from receiving the benefits flowing
from the institution of marriage. 5 The court found that if this truly
was the purpose of the exclusion, it was significantly under-inclusive
as there are many opposite-sex couples who marry for reasons other
than to have children, or indeed cannot have children.36 Ultimately,
the court dismissed the government's argument by pointing out that
not only do same-sex couples raise children, but that the state
explicitly allows same-sex couples to adopt children.37 In light of
these facts, the court determined that the statutory exclusion
operated to treat similarly situated persons differently. The court
futher noted that most of the couples who use assisted-reproductive
technology and other nontraditional methods of conception are
infertile opposite-sex couples.39 Therefore, the court dismissed the
State's argument that the statutory exclusion of same-sex couples
from the marriage laws because they cannot have children on their
own furthers a "perception of the link between procreation and child
rearing," and to discard such a notion would diminish mother's and
father's status vis i vis procreation and child rearing." Ultimately, the
court found that excluding same-sex couples from the benefits of
marriage furthered no valid public interest.4'
33. Id. at 878-79. The court explained that factors considered in making this
determination include: "(1) the significance of the benefits and protections of the challenged
Iaw, (2) whether the omission of members of the community... [furthers] the government's
goals; and (3) whether the classification is significantly under-inclusive or over-inclusive." Id. at
879.
34. SeeBaker v. State, 744 A.2d 864,880 (Vt. 1999).
35. See id at 881.
36. See id (noting that the state extends the benefits of marriage to opposite-sex couples
without imposing the "governmental goal").
37. See i&e at 882 (finding that the marital exclusion exposes same-sex couples' children to
the risks the state is trying to protect).
38. Seeid.
39. SeeBaker v. State, 744 A.2d 864, 880 (Vt. 1999).
40. Id.
41. See id at 884.
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Finally, the court tackled step three, which addressed whether the
"omission of a part of the community from the benefit, protection
and security of the challenged law bears a reasonable and just
relation to the governmental purpose."4 2 In light of the significance
of the rights and benefits flowing from marriage, s the determination
that the exclusion of members of the community furthers the
government's goals,44 and the significant under-inclusiveness of the
classification,4" the court found that the exclusion did not bear
reasonable and just relation to the stated governmental purpose."'
The court, therefore, found the statutory exclusion to be a violation
of the principles of the Common Benefits Clause of the Vermont
Constitution. 7
IV. THE VERMONT LEGISLATURE'S RESPONSE
The Vermont House and Senate have undertaken the challenge of
complying with the court's holding in Baker with admirable energy
and sincerity." After taking into account the views of the public
through hearings," nonbinding votes held on Town Meeting Day,"0
discussions with constituents,5' and their own personal beliefs, 2 the
members of the House decided that out of the alternatives
presented," the best option for satisfying the Court's mandate was
42. Id. at 878-79.
43. Id. at 884.
44. SeeBaker v. State, 744 A.2d 864, 884-86 (Vt. 1999).
45. See supra note 34 and accompanying discussion.
46. SeeBaker v. State, 744 A.2d 864, 884 (Vt. 2000).
47. See id. at 889.
48. See Ross Sneyd, Committee to Consider Reciprocal Beneficiaries, ASSOC. PRESS NEWSWIRE,
Mar. 1, 2000 (noting how the legislature is taking pains to address legitimate good-faith
concerns).
49. See Ross Sneyd, Gay Marriage to Top Gay Agenda Again, ASSOC. PRESS NEWSIVIRE, Jan. 30,
2000 (reporting on the House and SenateJudiciary Committees' hearings).
50. See Mike Eckel, Stockbridge Has Town Meeting, ASSOC. PRESS NEWSVWIRE, Mar. 7, 2000
(describing how the nonbinding votes will serve as guidance for state lawmakers trying to craft
legislation on same-sex unions).
51. See Sneyd, supra note 48 (quoting members of the legislature on the opinions of their
constituents).
52. See generally Elizabeth Mehren, Vermont Offers Gay Couples Benefits but Not Marriage, SALT
LAKE TRm., Feb. 14, 2000 at A6 (discussing the views of various members of the Vermont
legislature).
53. See Sneyd, supra note 49 (noting that the alternative was to amend existing marriage
statutes to allow same-sex couples to marry).
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through a system of domestic partnerships.s The Civil Union Bifl 55
passed after lengthy debate."
Although media reports stated that the Senate would basically sign
off on the bill as passed by the House,57 the Senate Judiciary
Committee plans to hold further hearings on the matter. 8
Ultimately, the Committee will revisit the option of a constitutional
amendment that would define "marriage" as a union between a man
and a woman.5'
V. CONCLUSION
Regardless of the final outcome of the legislative action, the
Vermont Supreme Court's holding in Baker is a truly fascinating
development in the growing debateo concerning whether same-sex
couples should be entitled to the same marital benefits that opposite-
sex couples enjoy.
SAM CHARRON
54. SeeSneyd, supra note 48.
55. See 1999 Vermont House Bill No. 847, Adjourned Session (Vt. 1999-2000).
56. See House Passes Same-Sex Rights Bill (visited Mar. 21, 2000)
<http://wvw.weax.com/now/story/0,1597,172637-390,00.shtml> (reporting that "[a] bill
creating civil unions passed on a 79 to 68 vote after a full day of passionate debate on the House
Floor").
57. See, e.g., Steve Marshall, News, USA TODAY, Mar. 17,2000, at 1A.
58. Seeid.
59. See Historian Advises Caution Wen Considering Constitutional Amendmen Assoc. PRESS
NEVSWIRE, Mar. 24,2000.
60. CompareHAw. REv. STAT. § 323-2 (1999) (extending the rights of a spouse to reciprocal
beneficiaries - as defined in HAW. REV. STAT. § 572C-4 - to include same-sex couples who
meet certain requirements in matters of hospital visitation and health care decisions), with
ALAsKA STAT. § 25.05.013 (Michie 1999) (withholding marriage benefits from same-sex
couples).
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